Currency choice in international trade: a new monetarist approach and firm-level evidence by Liu, Tao et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Currency choice in international trade: a
new monetarist approach and firm-level
evidence
Tao Liu and Dong Lu and Ruifeng Zhang
Department of Economics, UC Davis, Department of Economics,
Indiana University, European Department, IMF
15 May 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80068/
MPRA Paper No. 80068, posted 8 July 2017 06:54 UTC
Currency Choice in International Trade: A New
Monetarist Approach and Firm-level Evidence ∗
Tao Liu † Dong Lu ‡ Ruifeng Zhang §
Abstract
Financial market imperfections severely restrict currency use in international trade.
We develop a unified search-based framework with financial frictions to address the
determinants for currency choice, emphasizing the roles of trade finance and financial
market development, as well as macro, micro and strategic factors. In an open econ-
omy monetary search model with financial intermediation, the usage of a particular
currency will emerge endogenously and strategic complementaries among exporters,
importers and financial intermediation reinforce the status of international currency.
With highly disaggregated data from Colombia, we provide firm-level evidence that
financial factors significantly affect the patterns of currency usage. We show that
exporters prefer the currency with a more developed financial market, especially for
small firms in financially vulnerable sectors. In particular, a developing country with
medium-level of financial development could enhance its currency usage by more than
10% if it further develops financial market. Meanwhile, bad monetary policy and low
bargaining power of exporters will also hurt the popularity of currency, although em-
pirically firm-level bargaining power only has a secondary effect.
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1 Introduction
The currency chosen by exporters to set price is one of the most important and
interesting questions in international macroeconomics. Basically, an exporter can
choose its own currency (PCP), the destination country’s currency (LCP) or a third
country’s currency (VCP). This “invoicing currency” choice problem attracted sub-
stantial attention among academic researchers and policy makers for several reasons.
First, the currency denomination of international trade has real effects on the macroe-
conomy. It will directly affect how balance of payment and domestic prices react to
exchange rate fluctuation when price is sticky.1 Secondly, invoicing currency choice
has important policy implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy and the
choice of exchange rate regimes (Devereux and Engel, 2002; Corsetti and Pesenti,
2005). Thirdly, as a starting point, the currency denomination in international trade
is usually the first stage of currency internationalization (McKinnon, 1969).Given the
importance of this topic, what determines the currency choice? What are the roles
played by financial intermediaries, or more generally financial market? How would the
financial, macro, micro and strategic factors work together to reinforce each other?
What is the relative magnitude of their effects? These are the main questions our
paper tries to address.
Trade finance and financial market development have long been recognized as one
of the crucial factors in currency choices of international trade, but formal modeling
has been illusive. On one hand, the theory that links trade finance and financial mar-
ket development to invoicing currency choice is sparse.2 As Gopinath (2015) observed
“...it is often suggested that currency invoicing choices in trade transactions are re-
lated to the depth of financial markets in currencies, particularly in the provision of
trade credit...While this is plausible there is very little formal analysis of this linkage.”
On the other hand, historical experience clearly shows the essential role played by
trade finance and financial markets in currency internationalization.3 Recently, trade
finance still plays an important role in facilitating international trade, especially for
1The degree of exchange rate pass-through effects is closely linked to invoicing currency choice
as documented in Engel (2006) and Goldberg and Tille (2008).
2Previous studies in invoicing currency choices either emphasized macroeconomic factors such as
economy size and openness, or focused solely on the industrial or firm level factors. However, the
importance of trade finance and financial market development is largely overlooked without formal
modeling.
3As a recent example, US GDP surpassed Great Britain in 1870s, and U.S. share of world export
surged to 22.1% in 1913, but the international role of USD was essentially zero, while Sterling still
invoiced over 60% of world trade in early 1900s (Broz, 1997). The establishment of FED is believed
to speed up the rise of USD, with its favorable policy towards developing financial market and
providing trade credit(Eichengreen, 2011).
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developing countries.4 The key innovation in this paper is to explicitly consider the
link between financial market efficiency and endogenous invoicing currency choice.5
By integrating financial intermediation to the currency choice in international
trade, our paper provides a novel, tractable and unified framework to study how
financial, macro, micro and strategic factors jointly affect firm’s currency choice.6
Furthermore, we discipline our theory with empirical evidence using a proprietary
dataset of Colombia’s export from 2007 to 2013. With multinomial logit (MNL)
model, we are able to estimate and rank the effects of various factors on invoicing
currency choice.
In terms of model characteristics, we develop an open-economy monetary search
model (Lagos and Wright, 2005; Lester et al., 2012; Zhang, 2014), so as to incorpo-
rate various determinants of currency choice, especially trade finance and financial
development. Goods are assumed to be delivered one period after contract, and the
lack of commitment calls for liquidity provision to exporters with the fund of bankers,
who would get paid by importers in the next period. Financial intermediation oper-
ates at a fixed cost, and exporters receive liquidity at discount, so they would choose
the currency with a higher level of profit. Consequently, a currency is never used in
international trade if the issuing country does not have a liquid and efficient financial
market. Our model features the explicit consideration of time-to-ship friction and the
essential role played by trade finance. Strategic complementaries among exporters,
importers and bankers illustrate how financial, macro, micro and strategic factors re-
inforce the status of international currency. In this sense, our paper studies currency
choices using the New Monetarist approach as summarized in Lagos et al. (2015).
The theoretic model formulates four testable hypothesis. (i) The currency issued
by the destination country with better financial market development is more likely to
be used, especially for small firms more dependent on trade finance. This prediction
is novel and has not been identified in previous literature. (ii) Bad monetary policy,
such as high inflation and excessive exchange rate volatility, would make the currency
unattractive for international trades. This is consistent with the theoretic work in
4As reported in BIS report, US$6.58 trillion of bank-intermediated trade finance was provided
during 2011, supporting around 1/3 of international trade. Higher share for emerging markets.
5Despite the relevance of trade finance and financial intermediaries in international currency
choice, theoretical work on its implications for invoicing currency choice remains sparse. See Ahn
et al. (2011), Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) for trade finance related works.
6Recently there has been a growing literature on endogenous currency choice and its linkage to
exchange rate pass-through (Devereux et al., 2004; Engel, 2006; Goldberg and Tille, 2008; Gopinath
et al., 2010; Chung, 2016; Goldberg and Tille, 2016).
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Devereux et al. (2004), Engel (2006) and the empirical work in Wilander (2006),
Goldberg and Tille (2008) and Chung (2016). (iii) Exporters with higher bargaining
power are more likely to use home currency, consistent with the recent empirical work
by Goldberg and Tille (2016). (iv) In a three-country model, homogeneous goods tend
to rely more on the VCP, consistent with the “coalescing effect” as firstly identified
in Goldberg and Tille (2008).
Furthermore, we test these predictions using a novel dataset of Colombia’s export
firm from 2007 to 2013. Colombia is best described as a developing country heavily
relying on trade finance. The dataset covers 6.4 million individual export transactions
for around ten thousand exporting firms. Such a detailed transaction-level dataset
has not been used to study invoicing currency choice before. The richness of trade
information allows us to design empirical strategies to better identify the effects of
trade finance and financial market development, as well as other important determi-
nants. In the empirical analysis, we construct new measures for firm’s trade finance
dependence based on industry character (Manova, 2013) and transportation mode
(Ahn et al., 2011). In this way, we are able to provide the first empirical evidence on
how trade finance and financial market development affect invoicing currency choices.
Guided by our theoretical framework, a thorough econometric test is performed
on the highly disaggregated Colombia dataset.7 For financial factors, we find strong
support for our theory that financial development significantly affects the patterns of
currency usage. The MNL estimation shows that exporters tend to use the currency
with a more developed and efficient financial market, especially for small firms in
financially vulnerable sectors. In particular, a developing country with medium level
of financial development could enhance home currency usage by more than 10% if it
could further develop financial markets up to the top level.
For macroeconomic factors, we find that bad monetary policy, such as high in-
flation and excessive exchange rate volatility, would severely hurt the usage of a
currency. Specifically, one standard deviation increase in inflation and the coefficient
of variation in FX rate will decrease the likelihood of using that currency by 6.8% and
3.8% respectively. As for strategic factors, we also find that low bargaining power of
exporters will restrict the popularity of a currency, but the magnitude is relatively
smaller. In terms of micro factor, homogeneous goods are found more likely than
differentiated goods to be invoiced in VCP relative to PCP.
7For a long time little was known beyond several broad stylized facts based mainly on aggregate
data. Recently there are a few firm-level studies on Canadian (Goldberg and Tille, 2016) and British
(Chung, 2016), but they did not consider financial factors.
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Our study has important policy implications for developing countries seeking to
internationalize home currency but suffering from backward financial development,
volatile monetary policy, and inferior bargaining position of their exporters. The
results highlighted the importance of a deep, liquid and efficient financial market.
Equally importantly, a stable monetary policy will also help to significantly increase
the international use of one currency. In the counter-factual experiment, we find that
if China further developed its economy and financial market to the level of Japan,
RMB use would be promoted by around 16% in international trades.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 1.1 we briefly review
the related literature. In section 2, we develop an open-economy monetary search
model featuring financial frictions to show how financial, macro, micro and strate-
gic factors affect the choices among PCP, LCP and VCP. In section 3, we describe
the data and present preliminary empirical evidence among various key factors. A
formal econometric methodology and firm-level empirical evidence are discussed in
section 4, together with various robustness tests. The empirical results, at both firm
and transaction level, strongly support the main predictions of our theory. Section 5
concludes with further discussions on policy implications.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the important literature that analyzes the endogenous
invoicing currency choice. Our open-economy monetary search framework is closely
related to Zhang (2014), which is based on the model of Lagos and Wright (2005) and
Lester et al. (2012) in monetary economics. Zhang (2014) provides the important in-
sights that strategic complementarity in portfolio choices between buyer and seller, as
well as information acquisition decisions of sellers, generates multiple equilibria with
different international currency regimes. The main departure we make is to introduce
trade finance and financial intermediation.8 Monetary search models are particularly
suitable for the issue of currency choice, since they explicitly discuss the role of fiat
money and allow agents to choose different currencies rather than make exogenous
8Search theory has a long history of modeling the rise of international currency (e.g. Matsuyama
et al., 1993; Trejos et al., 1996), but suffers from the indivisibility of money and the inability to reach
equilibrium. With the breakthrough in Lagos and Wright (2005), such models are now widely applied
to provide new insight into topics of international economics (e.g. Lester et al., 2012; Geromichalos
and Simonovska, 2014; Jung and Pyun, 2016; Zhang, 2014).
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assumptions9. Moreover, the tractability of search-theoretic models enables us to
comprehensively evaluate the effect of financial, macro, micro and strategic factors.
This paper further contributes to the firm-level empirical analysis on invoicing
currency choice.10 Recently, improved access to custom data allows for more system-
atic analysis at firm or transaction level. For Canadian import, Goldberg and Tille
(2016) synthesized the macro, micro and strategic factors for currency choice, and
documented that larger transaction size helps promote LCP. Devereux et al. (2017)
also adopted Canadian dataset to show the non-monotone relationship between mar-
ket share and invoicing currency choice. Our empirical methodology is most close to
Chung (2016) that employed UK data in 2011 and found that firms relying more on
foreign currency-denominated input are less likely to invoice their export by home
currency. This paper adds new firm-level evidence to the empirical literature, with
a particular focus on the trade finance and financial factors in determining invoicing
currency choices. Furthermore, while the existing empirical literature are mainly for
industrial countries, firm-level analysis for developing countries is quite rare, and that
would distinguish our paper from others.11
This paper is also related with a vast literature discussing the impact of financial
frictions on international trade. Amiti and Weinstein (2011) highlighted the collapse
of trade finance as an important reason for Japanese financial crisis in 1990s. Feenstra
et al. (2014) used Chinese firm data to show that exporters faced a tighter credit con-
straint than purely domestic firms. The heterogeneous-firm model in Manova (2013)
and Chaney (2016) also proved that financial frictions affected both the intensive and
extensive margin of international trade. The credit constraint in these works normally
refers to working capital loan, which is made before production and mostly in home
currency. In our model, however, the trade credit provided by bank is made after
9The classical New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature mostly assume PCP (e.g. Obstfeld
and Rogoff, 1995). To remove this assumption, some literature, such as Bacchetta and Van Wincoop
(2005), Engel (2006), and Goldberg and Tille (2008), allowed exporters to choose currency and pre-
set price to hedge exchange rate risk. Fully appreciating the importance of short-term fluctuation,
we consider our model complementary to the previous study by considering other relevant factors
such as financial development.
10Empirical studies with country-level also proved fruitful in many ways, and the leading research
includes Kamps (2006), Goldberg and Tille (2008), Ito and Chinn (2014), and Ito and Kawai (2016)
The lack of heterogeneity and variation at micro level, however, limits the significance of their results
and makes us prefer firm-level analysis.
11The conventional wisdom in classical literature, such as Grassman (1973) and McKinnon (1969),
casually observes that developing countries’ home currency is seldom used for international trade,
because of either their small economic influence, or the large share of homogeneous goods in ex-
port. Whether this observation still holds today is open to question. For example, Reiss (2015)
convincingly showed that the main exports denominated in Brazilian real are homogeneous goods.
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production and could be denominated in various currencies.
Finally, this paper is related to the studies that focused on the pattern of payment
method in trade finance but ignored firm’s currency choice in this process. Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2013) built a model of contract choice and the equilibrium is determined
by financial efficiency and contract environment. The empirical evidence in Schmidt-
Eisenlohr and Niepmann (2015) showed that Letter of Credit is mostly employed
with intermediate contract environment and riskier destination country. Ahn (2015)
took advantage of Colombian and Chilean dataset to document the dominance of
post-shipment payment, and explained it in a model featured by account-receivable
financing. Although our model assumed trade finance by bank, the implication for
invoicing currency choice remains robust with alternative payment methods.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we develop a theory that relates invoicing currency choice to fi-
nancial, macro, micro and strategic factors. We mainly follow the endogenous choice
of international currency in Zhang (2014), and add the new channel of trade finance.
In international trade, financial restrictions have a large impact, especially for devel-
oping countries like Colombia, so the addition of financial intermediary is realistic
and reasonable. Different from the information theory in Zhang (2014), our model
features time-to-ship friction and emphasizes financial development as an important
determinant of invoicing currency choice.12 The time-to-ship friction is both empir-
ically relevant and theoretically important. In reality, international trade normally
takes longer time and involves larger volume than domestic trade, so participants face
more risk and uncertainty (Manova, 2013). In theory, the time-to-ship friction has
dual effects on our model structure. First, The timing mismatch between shipment
and payment, combined with the lack of commitment between exporter and importer,
necessitates the existence of financial intermediation to facilitate trade. Second, since
exporters need immediate liquidity from bankers, who would get paid by importer
only in the next period, so the payment received by exporter would be discounted
by nominal interest rate, therefore making a channel for monetary policy to directly
influence international trade.
Several papers already noticed this kind of financial friction and tried to incorpo-
rate it into monetary search model. For example, Wright et al. (2016) modeled dif-
12Here we focus on a partial equilibrium setup for exporter’s currency choice. Interested reader
could refer to Liu (2016) for the version of general equilibrium.
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ferent channels to finance trade credit, both internal and external, and had in-depth
discussion on its relationship with monetary policy and banking sector regulation.
Our paper, however, diverges from previous literature by focusing on trade finance
rather than trade credit. As discussed in Amiti and Weinstein (2011), trade credit is
more of an accounting concept, referring to the accounts receivable in balance sheet,
regardless of whether it’s domestic or international trade. Trade finance, on the other
hand, is exclusively for international trade, denoting the loans extended to exporters
so that their production cost could be covered in time. Our model is greatly simpli-
fied by focusing on trade finance by banks, so that exporters and importers wouldn’t
worry about default. Meanwhile, the model’s implication for international currency
choice remains robust for other types of payment method like open account or cash
in advance.
2.1 Environment
The following monetary search model is based on Lagos and Wright (2005) and
extends the two-country model in Zhang (2014) and Liu (2016). The two-country
framework is presented first and then extended to incorporate three-country and
VCP. Time is discrete and infinite. There are two countries in the world, 1 and 2,
each populated with a unit measure of buyer, seller and banker, who live forever with
a discount factor of β ∈ (0, 1). Their identity is fixed over time and their respective
population in country i ∈ {1, 2} is σi, σi, and (1− 2σi). Sellers always stay at home
while buyers and bankers could go abroad. Each period is divided into three rounds
of centralized market (CM), decentralized market (DM), and financial market (FM).
For DM transaction, if buyer and seller are from different countries, we would call
them importer and exporter. There is divisible and storable fiat money circulating
in each country, and its total supply evolves according to Mˆi = (1 + µi)Mi, where
Mi is the stock of country i’s fiat money in current period, and variable with a hat is
the level in next period. The growth rate of money supply µi is under the control of
central bank. To feature scale of economy in financial sector, we assume a fixed total
cost for banking industry. To avoid indeterminacy, bankers are further assumed to
be specialized in home-currency business.13
Here we start with a brief introduction on model, and detailed formulation follows.
In DM, sellers are specialized in the production of a perishable differentiated good
q but unable to consume it, while buyers are able to consume but couldn’t produce.
13This assumption is strong but not unreasonable. It just implies that domestic banks are efficient
financial intermediaries in their home currency, as discussed in McKinnon (1979) and Eichengreen
(2011)
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The lack of commitment and double coincidence requires fiat money as medium of ex-
change. Importantly, q is delivered only at the beginning of next period. For domestic
trade, we assume it’s always settled by home currency after delivery, and there’s no
role for banker. Our model is focused on international trade, where agents from dif-
ferent countries don’t trust each other. Exporters want to get paid immediately after
shipment, but importers promise to pay only after the delivery of goods in the next
period. In this case, bankers could facilitate trade by providing financial intermedi-
ation: exporters get liquidity from banker at a discount, and importers pay bankers
later to get goods. The currency choice is made by exporters, whose profit function
depends on gains from trade, monetary policy, and financial efficiency. Goods would
be shipped afterwards.
In FM, bankers first select the location of their business based on exporter’s cur-
rency choice. If country 1 exporters choose home currency to settle international
trade, country 1 bankers would pay a fixed total cost to setup financial industry in
country 1. On the other hand, if country 1 exporters choose foreign currency, coun-
try 2 bankers would enter the market. After the establishment of financial industry,
exporters show the proof of shipment and get liquidity from bankers at a discount.
At the beginning of next period, goods are delivered, and importers pay bankers to
get them. In the following CM, buyer, seller, and banker engage in the production
and consumption of nume´raire good X and adjust their holdings of fiat money based
on the pattern of currency usage in the last period.14 This CM functions as a fric-
tionless FX market, which is certainly not without loss of generality as discussed in
Geromichalos and Jung (2017), but we hold this assumption to simplify the model
and focus on financial frictions. The model timing for international trade is depicted
in figure 1.
2.2 Model Setup
Now we will begin to formalize the physical environment. For tractability, as-
sume the instantaneous utility function is UB = u(q) + U(X) − H for buyer, US =
−c(q) +U(X)−H for seller, and U I = U(X)−H for banker, where q, X, and H cap-
ture the amount of differentiated good, nume´raire good, and working hour. Although
every agent could produce nume´raire good with a linear technology of X = H, only
sellers could produce differentiated good with the cost function of c(q). We further
assume that the optimal consumption in CM is X∗, such that U ′(X∗) = 1. The
conventional assumption on function form also holds, so u(0) = c(0) = 0, u′(0) =
14To match the model timing, we assume nume´raire good is perished at the end of each period,
and differentiated good is perished at the beginning of each period.
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Figure 1: Model timing
CM
Centralized Market
DM
Decentralized Market
FM
Finanical Market
Goods arrived
Importers pay bankers
CM open
Agents adjust
currency holding
Terms of trade
determined
Exporters choose
currency
Goods shipped
Bankers choose
business location
Exporters receive
liquidity from bankers
+∞, c′(0) = 0, u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, c′ > 0, c′′ > 0. For notations below, i, j = {1, 2}, i 6= j.
The real value of country i’s fiat money in terms of nume´raire good is φi. This model
is focused on stationary monetary equilibrium where the aggregate real balance is
constant, therefore 1 + µi =
φi
φˆi
. Central banks adjust home currency supply through
lump-sum transfer to domestic agent when CM opens.
There is separate DM in each country. Buyers could go abroad with a probability
of (1 − α) while sellers always stay at home. Buyer and seller meet pairwise and at
random, with a matching function of Ni = N(Bi, Si), where the number of successful
matching Ni is a function of buyer and seller’s number in country i’s DM. From this
matching function, the number of meeting between country i buyer and country j
seller (nij), as well as the probability for country i buyer to meet country j seller (pij)
are determined.15 Banking industry is perfect competitive and specialized in home-
currency business. The total cost for country i banking industry to operate in country
j is Fij, assumed to be fixed over time. The value of Fij reflects both financial efficiency
and openness. If a country’s banking sector could operate with low cost and foreign
branching is supported or subsidized by government policy, Fij will stay at a low level.
CM is open to buyer, seller, and banker from both countries. This Walrasian
market allows agents to freely adjust their holding of currency, so it’s similar to a
15Here we are not explicit about the matching function, since any N(B,S) ≥ min(B,S) would
work. Another reason for ignoring the function form is that our model focused on bargaining power
rather than searching friction in exporter’s currency choice. Interested reader could refer to Liu
(2016) for the importance of searching friction on global imbalance.
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frictionless foreign exchange market.16 In our model, the decision by different types
of agents is public information, which incorporates the elements of strategic comple-
mentarity. For exporter, his expectation of ultimate profit from DM trade is based
on the decision of banker and importer. For banker, his business location is based
on exporter’s currency choice, and his currency choice is linked to importer’s choice
in CM. For importer, his optimal decision is tightly related with exporter’s currency
choice. The strategic complementarity among different types of agents is depicted in
the figure 2. The decision of a certain type of agent affects other’s choice, and that
would reinforce the status of international currency.
Figure 2: Strategic complementarity
Exporters
Importers Bankers
currency
choice location
liquidity
payment
goods
2.3 Optimal choice for agents
2.3.1 CM Value function
Agent’s CM value function differs according to his type. Buyers want to hold money
at the end of CM to buy differentiated good in the next period, therefore the CM
maximization problem for country i buyer is
WBi (φim
i
i, φjm
i
j) = max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j ,H,X
U(X)−H + E[V Bi (φˆimˆii, φˆjmˆij)]
s.t. φimˆ
i
i + φjmˆ
i
j +X ≤ H + φimii + φjmij + Ti
16In the real world, the foreign exchange market is OTC market with bid-ask spreads, and mone-
tary search models are already widely applied in this field. See Lu (2016) for FX market in China.
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where mij is country i buyer’s holding of country j currency; V
B
i (·) is country i buyer’s
value function for DM trade; Ti is the lump-sum transfer from country i central bank.
Buyer’s expectation of DM value function is based on the pattern of currency usage
in the last period. With the observation that buyer’s value function is linear in his
holding of money, this value function could be simplified into
WBi (φim
i
i, φjm
i
j) = W
B
i (0, 0) + φim
i
i + φjm
i
j (1)
Sellers don’t have any incentive to hold money in CM since the liquidity he would
get from bank is irrelevant with his money holding. His value function is therefore
omitted. For country i banker, the CM value function is
W Ii (φizi) = max
zˆi,H,X
U(X)−H + E[V Ii (φˆizˆi)]
s.t. φizˆi +X ≤ H + φizi + Ti
where V Ii (·) is the value function for banker in financial market, related with his
holding of home currency (zˆi). Similarly, this value function could be transformed
into
W Ii (φizi) = W
I
i (0) + φizi (2)
2.3.2 Terms of trade in DM
Buyer and seller make a proportional bargaining in DM to determine terms of
trade. Buyer’s utility maximization problem is
max
q,d(m)
{u(q)− φd(m)}
s.t. u(q)−φd(m)
φd(m)− c(q)
β
= θ
1−θ
d(m) ≤ m
where q is the amount of differentiated good; d(m) is the amount of fiat money buyers
pay; θ and (1 − θ) represent the bargaining power of buyer and seller. Since buyers
make payment only when q is delivered at the beginning of next period, seller’s cost
function is adjusted by discount factor. The solution is
d(m) =
{
m∗ if φm ≥ (1− θ)u(q∗) + θc(q∗)/β
m otherwise
where q∗ is the level of consumption that would maximize total surplus such that
βu′(q∗) = c′(q∗); m∗ is buyer’s payment when total surplus is maximized, so φm∗ =
11
(1 − θ)u(q∗) + θ c(q∗)
β
. It will become clear later that buyer’s holding of fiat money
would never exceed m∗, because additional money doesn’t increase his gains from
trade, but incurs a loss from inflation. Therefore, buyer’s payment to seller is
φm = (1− θ)u(q) + θc(q)
β
(3)
with q ≤ q∗, βu′(q∗) = c′(q∗).
2.3.3 Financial constraint and exporter’s currency choice
The time-to-ship friction imposed financial constraint on equilibrium. Without
trade finance, country i exporter’s profit in DM trade with country j importer is
simply
φim
j
i − c(qji ) (4)
where qji is country j buyer’s purchase of differentiated good settled in country i cur-
rency.
Now with financial friction, the immediate liquidity provided by bank must be
able to cover exporter’s DM cost. Given a perfect competitive banking sector, zero
profit condition holds, so the immediate liquidity is equal to the proceedings from
importer’s future payment, net of banking sector’s fixed cost. Here we assume the
fund is equally split among exporters, whose actual profit therefore depends on the
ratio between banker’s fund available and importer’s payment in the next period.
Consider country i exporter’s profit for trade settled in his home currency. The
total fund of banking industry after CM, net of the fixed total cost, is [(1−2σi)φizii−
Fii]. Here zij is country i banker’s fund allocated to country j. From banker’s optimal
currency holding derived later, the rate of return in banking sector should be able to
compensate the loss from inflation, so that, in this special case,
Ri =
njiφim
j
i
(1− 2σi)φizii − 1
where Ri ≡ 1+µiβ − 1 is the nominal interest rate of country i.17 With the equations
above, it’s possible to simplify the ratio between the liquidity provided by bank and
the payment from importer
17This nominal interest rate is derived from Fisher equation. In this model, the real interest rate
is approximated by 1/β, and inflation rate is 1 + µ. So 1 + R = (1 + µ)/β according to Fisher
equation.
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(1− 2σi)φizii − Fii
njiφim
j
i
=
(1− 2σi)φizii − Fii
(1 +Ri)[(1− 2σi)φizii] =
{
1− Fii
(1− 2σi)φizii
}(
1
1 +Ri
)
So country i exporter’s profit from international trade settled in home currency is
pii ≡
[
1− Fii
(1− 2σi)φizii
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
financial development
(
1
1 +Ri
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
discount
φim
j
i − c(qji )︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain from trade
(5)
This profit function could be decomposed into three parts. First and foremost, fi-
nancial development is negatively related with the fixed cost in banking sector (Fii),
and positive in banker’s total funding in country i (zii). Second, the discount factor
affected by central bank’s monetary policy. Lastly, exporter’s gain from trade after
the bargaining game with importer. For trade settled in foreign currency, we further
assume that exporters suffer additional loss from transaction cost (τ), such as the
costs for hedging, which is assumed to be an increasing function of importer’s real
payment (φjm
j
j), so the profit function using foreign currency becomes
pi∗i ≡
[
1− τ(φjmjj)
][
1− Fji
(1− 2σj)φjzji
](
1
1 +Rj
)
φjm
j
j − c(qjj ) (6)
With these in mind, country i sellers choose settlement currency to maximize profit.
∀i = 1, 2

autarky if max{pii, pi∗i } < 0
si = 1 if max{pii, pi∗i } ≥ 0, pii ≥ pi∗i
si = 0 if max{pii, pi∗i } ≥ 0, pii < pi∗i
(7)
where si is country i exporter’s currency choice, equal to 1 when his home currency
settles international trade.
2.3.4 Banker’s optimal choice in financial market
If exporters find international trade profitable and choose a certain currency for
settlement, bankers need to setup business accordingly. Since banking industry is
perfect competitive, zero profit condition implies the following optimal choice for
country i bankers.
∀i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j

Ri =
njiφim
j
i
(1−2σi)φizii − 1 if si = 1
Ri =
nijφim
i
i
(1−2σi)φizij − 1 if sj = 0
zi = zii = zij = 0 otherwise
(8)
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Here zij is the country i banker’s fund allocated to country j, and zi = zii + zij. The
first condition states that, if country i exporters choose home currency, country i
banker would setup business there and allocate zii to exporters, so that the nominal
return in banking industry is equal to the nominal interest rate, which is the marginal
cost of holding fiat money. Similarly, if foreign exporters choose country i currency,
the banker would provide liquidity with the amount of zij, also making the rate of
return equal to nominal interest rate. If country i currency remained national, i.e.
si = 0 and sj = 1, country i banker wouldn’t hold any currency, as stated in the third
condition above.
2.3.5 Optimal choice for buyer
For buyer, the optimal holding of real balance is available after combining CM
and DM value function. For country i buyer, his DM value function is
V Bi (φim
i
i, φjm
i
j) = β
(
pii+(1−sj)pij
)(
u(qii)−φimii
)
+βpijsj
(
u(qij)−φjmij
)
+βWBi (φˆimˆ
i
i, φˆjmˆ
i
j)
where (pii + (1− sj)pij
)(
u(qii)− φimii
)
is country i buyer’s expected surplus for DM
trade settled in country i currency, and pijsj
(
u(qij) − φjmij
)
is his expected surplus
for trade settled in country j currency.
Substitute this into the expression of buyer’s CM value function, then his maxi-
mization problem becomes
max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j
{
(βφˆi − φi)mˆii + β
(
pii + (1− sj)pij
)
θ
[
u(qˆii)−
c(qˆii)
β
]
+(βφˆj − φj)mˆij + βsjpijθ
[
u(qˆij)−
c(qˆij)
β
]}
Several conventional observation in monetary search model would also apply here.
For example, the solution for maximization problem requires βφˆi−φi < 0 andm < m∗.
The first order condition for home currency is
Ri = (pii + (1− sj)pij)
[
θ(u′(qii)− c′(qii)/β)
(1− θ)u′(qii) + θc′(qii)/β
]
(9)
This condition states that buyer’s marginal cost of holding money (Ri) must be
equal to the expected marginal benefit. Notice that buyer’s demand for home currency
is always positive since his meeting with domestic sellers would always use home
currency as medium of exchange. This is not true for foreign currency, which crucially
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depends on foreign seller’s decision.
∀i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j

qij = 0 if sj = 0
Rj = pij
[
θ(u′(qij)−c′(qij)/β)
(1−θ)u′(qij)+θc′(qij)/β
]
if sj = 1
(10)
With agent’s optimal choice and money market clearing condition, it’s possible to
define a general equilibrium allowing for international currency. The formal definition
is relegated to appendix.
2.4 Three-country model and VCP
The model could be easily extended into three-country case to account for the
emergence of international vehicle currency (IVC) and vehicle currency pricing (VCP).
Related details and equilibrium conditions are derived in appendix. The currency
choice is similar to two-country model with the following profit function for exporters.
pikij =
(
1−τj(φkmik)
)(
1− Fkj
(1− 2σk)φkzkj
)(
1
1 +Rk
)
φkm
i
k−cj(qik), ∀i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(11)
In this profit function, pikij stands for country j seller’s profit with country i buyer
if trade is settled by country k currency, and other notations follow the two-country
model above. The determinants of currency choice still include financial development,
discount factor, and gains from trade. This profit function provides one explanation
for the wide use of USD in international trade: stable monetary policy and supreme
financial efficiency make USD attractive even for trade not involving United States.
By the same token, if the issuing country of a currency has a highly developed fi-
nancial market, the invoicing currency of its international trade would have a better
chance to deviate from VCP.
Another main finding from three-country model is that homogeneous goods tend
to rely more on VCP. This is from the observation that sellers are mainly distin-
guished by their gains from trade, i.e., the financial development and discount factor
in profit function are less relevant with seller’s nationality. For homogeneous goods
with standard exchange, sellers are very similar in bargaining power, so their choice
is focused more on the financial premium of a currency, which leads to the rise of a
single IVC to invoice international trade. Therefore, the model predicts that homo-
geneous goods use more of USD due to its financial supremacy, which is consistent
with the empirical finding in Goldberg and Tille (2008).
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2.5 Currency choice determinants and testable hypotheses
Through the above discussions, we focus on partial equilibrium analysis for ex-
porter’s currency choice and summarize the theoretical results in Proposition 1-4.
For international trade settled by home currency, exporter’s profit function is
pi =
[
1− F
(1− 2σ)φz
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
financial development
(
1
1 +R
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
discount
φm− c(q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain from trade
(12)
where F stands for the total fixed cost of home banking sector, (1 − 2σ)φz for the
liquidity provided by bankers, φm for importer’s real payment, and R for the nominal
interest rate of home currency, controlled by central bank through the growth rate of
money supply, R = 1+µ
β
− 1. On the other hand, if international trade is settled by
foreign currency, exporter’s profit function is
pi∗ =
(
1− τ(φ∗m∗)
)[
1− F
∗
(1− 2σ)φ∗z∗
](
1
1 +R∗
)
φ∗m∗ − c(q∗) (13)
where asterisk denotes foreign variables. Exporters choose the settlement currency
that brings him a higher level of profit. With these in mind, there are four main
determinants of currency choice, regarding to the following four propositions.
First, a higher level of financial market development makes a currency more at-
tractive. This observation is straightforward from the profit function decreasing in
the fixed cost of banking sector (F ) and increasing in the financial market liquidity
(1− 2σ)φz. This leads to Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: (Financial) The currency issued by a country with better develop-
ment in financial market is more likely to be used for international trade.
Second, currency with lower level of inflation is preferred. This intuitive result is
also obvious from the profit function decreasing in nominal interest rate (R). Sim-
ilarly, if we consider monetary policy uncertainty, the currency with higher foreign
exchange rate volatility will be less likely to be used. In our model, the effect of mon-
etary policy works both directly and indirectly on exporter’s profit function. Directly,
nominal interest rate would affect discount rate, which arises due to time-to-ship fric-
tion and the lag between payment and shipment. Indirectly, the growth rate of money
supply and nominal interest rate would influence the currency holding by banker and
buyer, as explicitly shown in equation 8, 9, and 10. The detailed proof for Proposition
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2 is in appendix.
Proposition 2: (Macro) Bad monetary policies, such as high inflation and exces-
sive exchange rate volatility, would make the currency unattractive for international
trade.
Thirdly, the bargaining power between exporter and importer affects currency
choice. Here we take advantage of partial equilibrium analysis and propose that
exporters with higher bargaining power prefer home currency under very general as-
sumptions. The formal proof is relegated to appendix.
Proposition 3: (Strategic) Exporters with higher bargaining power would prefer to
use their home currency in trade.
Fourthly, as argued in the previous subsection, the model predicts that homoge-
neous goods are more likely to use VCP.
Proposition 4: (Micro) Homogeneous goods are more likely to use VCP.
3 Data, Facts and Determinants of Invoicing Cur-
rency Choices
In this section, we start by describing the dataset used for the empirical analysis.
First, we describe the Colombia dataset in details and show various firm-level de-
scriptive statistics. The key message is: in the Colombia dataset, there are a large
number of exporting firms that are selling to a large number of destination countries
in a variety of industries and products, using many invoicing currencies. Next, we
demonstrate that there are substantial variations in invoicing currency choices in
Colombia export, among destination countries and industries. These cross-sectional
and time-series variations in invoicing currency choices are crucial for econometric
analysis in the next section. Then we provide a broad preliminary assessment of the
various factors behind invoicing currency choice for Colombia exporters, highlighting
the key factors emphasized in the theoretic model. We end up this section with dis-
cussion on the advantages and limitation of Colombia dataset.
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3.1 Data Source and Descriptive Statistics
Our primary data source covers daily export transactions from the Colombian Cus-
toms Office for the 2007-2013 period.18 This novel database covers 6.4 million indi-
vidual export transactions for Colombia exporters, from January 2007 to December
2013. Each transaction is recorded in a custom invoice containing information on the
date, exporter’s name, exporter’s ID, country of destination, currency of invoicing,
industry and product code (up to HS10), transportation method (by sea, by air, by
railway, etc.), FOB value in US dollar (USD), quantity, and gross weight. We com-
plement the export data with a detailed import data. 19
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Colombia’s Export (2013)
Number of exporters 9,898
Number of HS6 digit code exported 3,582
Number of destination country 137
Number of Currency 24
Number of transactions 907,153
Percent of transactions shipped by sea 43.4%
Average shipment value (thousand USD) 60,327
Median shipment value (thousand USD) 2,375.2
Colombia Export Value (billion USD) 54.7
Table 1 gives a snapshot of Colombia’s exports in 2013. Other years are similar.
Nearly 10,000 Colombia firms export to more than 130 countries. In sum, 24 different
currencies are used. The total transaction number is 907,153 and 43.4% were shipped
by sea. There are 3,582 varieties of HS6 products in 2013. Overall, a large number of
exporters sell various products to different countries with multiple invoicing curren-
cies. Table 17, 18 and 19 in the appendix take a further step to look at distribution
over destinations, industries and destination-industry pairs respectively.
The broad composition of exports to 16 different industries and 5 regions is present
in table 2. We find Colombia’s trade partner is mainly Latin America countries, with
58.9% in count share. In contrast, North America has a smaller count share of 20.75%,
which means United States doesn’t play a dominant role as in the previous literature.20
18The data is obtained from Datamyne, a company that specializes in documenting import and
export transactions in the Americas. For more detail please see www.datamyne.com.
19Although the import data is much richer than export, it does not have invoicing currency
information.
20The trade share with U.S. was 58.9% in Goldberg and Tille (2016) and 29% in Chung (2016).
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Table 2: Colombia Exports Distribution across industries and regions (2007-2013)
Region share (by count) Industry share
Industry Category North America Latin America Euro Asia Other Count Value
Animal Products 27.15% 35.35% 14.71% 14.05% 8.74% 0.93% 1.26%
Vegetable Products 56.01% 3.43% 17.61% 3.82% 19.13% 19.52% 9.71%
Foodstuffs 17.37% 56.62% 6.30% 1.36% 18.34% 6.37% 2.99%
Mineral Products 19.34% 53.27% 6.53% 6.83% 14.03% 1.41% 57.85%
Chemicals 1.92% 85.19% 1.08% 0.36% 11.45% 18.95% 4.24%
Plastics/Rubbers 8.84% 76.63% 3.26% 0.58% 10.68% 7.74% 3.30%
Leathers/Furs/Hides 30.96% 43.20% 8.58% 6.07% 11.19% 1.58% 0.63%
Wood Products 8.53% 75.76% 2.23% 1.37% 12.11% 5.80% 1.63%
Textiles 15.46% 73.19% 3.99% 0.49% 6.86% 16.67% 3.04%
Footwear/Headgear 11.93% 76.54% 3.92% 0.16% 7.45% 0.95% 0.23%
Stone/Glass 27.53% 57.72% 3.07% 0.94% 10.75% 4.90% 5.91%
Metals 15.85% 59.51% 4.43% 9.89% 10.31% 5.10% 4.46%
Machinery/Electrical 12.95% 77.01% 2.95% 0.91% 6.17% 5.19% 2.07%
Transportation 9.17% 86.13% 1.01% 0.51% 3.18% 1.20% 1.82%
Miscellaneous 13.33% 68.30% 6.21% 2.52% 9.64% 0.63% 0.18%
Service 14.45% 70.62% 4.09% 0.47% 10.37% 3.03% 0.69%
Region total 20.75% 58.92% 6.20% 2.07% 12.06%
Some industries account for a large share of Colombia exports. In terms of counts,
Vegetable Products, Chemicals and Textiles account for a large share of exports. In
terms of value, mineral products accounts for half of the total exports value. This
is not surprising given that Colombia is a developing country rich in natural resources.
3.2 Characteristics of Invoicing Currency Choices
Next we report some patterns related to currency choice for Colombia exporters.
We first discuss the cross-sectional variation of currency choices in table 3 and 4.
Then we look at the time series variation in Figure 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the appendix.
Table 3 displays the currency distribution (PCP, LCP, VCP) over major trade
partners. USD has a dominant role in exports to Unites States. While the PCP and
LCP are lower relative to VCP, there are still substantial variations. For example,
Euro area enjoys a substantial share of LCP in Colombia’s export, but individual
countries has distinct shares. France has 13.52% of transactions invoiced in LCP
while Netherlands has only 6.79%. This variation is also obvious when we look at
19
Table 3: Invoicing currency by destination countries (2007-2013)
Count share Value share
PCP LCP VCP PCP LCP VCP
United States 0.25% 99.73% 0.03% 0.37% 99.62% 0.00%
France 0.79% 13.52% 85.70% 0.03% 2.99% 96.97%
Spain 1.02% 12.25% 86.73% 2.30% 2.26% 95.44%
Netherlands 0.37% 6.79% 92.84% 0.05% 0.72% 99.23%
Germany 0.03% 9.27% 90.71% 0.01% 2.40% 97.58%
UK 0.03% 1.60% 98.37% 0.05% 0.23% 99.72%
Canada 0.03% 0.07% 99.90% 0.16% 0.01% 99.83%
Venezuela 0.14% 1.85% 98.01% 0.52% 2.56% 96.92%
Peru 0.19% 0.00% 99.81% 0.56% 0.01% 99.43%
Mexico 0.23% 0.24% 99.53% 1.75% 0.18% 98.07%
China 8.55% 0.00% 91.45% 0.47% 0.00% 99.53%
Korea 0.03% 0.02% 99.95% 0.00% 0.03% 99.97%
Japan 0.00% 1.36% 98.64% 0.00% 1.11% 98.89%
Australia 0.02% 0.06% 99.92% 0.04% 0.10% 99.86%
other regions such as Asia. For Colombia export to China, 8.55% is invoiced by
Colombia Peso (COP) and Chinese Yuan (RMB) is rarely used. When Colombia
firms are exporting to Japan, 1.36% is denominated in Japanese Yen (JPY) and COP
is almost never chosen. In the case of South Korea, it is in the middle. Table 4 shows
the variations of currency choices at industry level. The share of PCP is relatively
larger (15.87%) in mineral products whereas the share of PCP falls to almost zero in
food industry.
The currency choice also has considerable variation over time, as shown in Figure
3, 4, 5 and 6 in the appendix. Before the 2008 global financial crisis, the usage
of USD is very high and stable. During 2008, its share started to decline and the
share of Euro and COP started to increase. This could partially reflect that during
the great trade collapse, USD-based trade finance was disturbed and exporters in
Colombia started to look for alternative currencies. After August 2011, the share of
USD further decreased and other currencies gained more ground.
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Table 4: Invoicing currency by industry (2007-2013)
Count share Value share
PCP LCP VCP PCP LCP VCP
Animal Products 0.02% 25.67% 74.31% 0.36% 6.53% 93.11%
Vegetable Products 0.01% 52.76% 47.24% 0.04% 46.28% 53.69%
Foodstuffs 0.00% 19.82% 80.17% 0.01% 18.77% 81.22%
Mineral Products 15.87% 17.43% 66.70% 0.67% 45.74% 53.59%
Chemicals 0.06% 4.56% 95.38% 0.14% 5.95% 93.92%
Plastics/Rubbers 0.04% 11.53% 88.43% 0.01% 11.67% 88.33%
Leathers/Furs/Hides 0.10% 33.62% 66.28% 0.04% 21.53% 78.43%
Wood Products 0.03% 12.39% 87.58% 0.02% 7.48% 92.50%
Texiles 0.02% 17.25% 82.74% 0.01% 20.35% 79.63%
Footwear/Headgear 0.05% 13.54% 86.42% 0.01% 5.97% 94.02%
Stone/Glass 0.03% 29.48% 70.50% 0.00% 60.37% 39.63%
Metals 0.04% 18.92% 81.04% 0.01% 13.07% 86.91%
Machinery/Electrical 0.06% 13.76% 86.18% 0.15% 16.46% 83.39%
Transportation 0.04% 9.56% 90.40% 0.01% 7.21% 92.78%
Miscellaneous 0.51% 14.27% 85.23% 0.39% 20.08% 79.53%
Service 0.07% 16.66% 83.27% 0.23% 17.27% 82.50%
3.3 Broad assessment of the currency choices of Colombia
Trade
Here we start a broad assessment of currency choices and show how it is related to
financial, macro, micro and strategic factors. The major variables we consider involve
financial development, inflation, exchange rate volatility, product differentiation, and
firm-level bargaining power. All related graphs are present in the appendix. Note
that United States is not included in these graphs.
Financial Factor
For financial factors, we consider financial market development as a key measure.
Our model predicts that if the destination country has a higher level of financial de-
velopment, its currency will be more likely to be used. Private credit over GDP is
selected as proxy for financial development.
Figure 7, 8 and 9 in appendix show these patterns. The countries with higher
financial development level are more likely to have its own currency chosen for trade
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Table 5: Currency Choices and Product Differentiation (2007-2013)
Heterogeneous Goods Homogeneous Goods
VCP 73.62% 82.33%
LCP 26.06% 17.52%
PCP 0.32% 0.14%
Table 6: Invoicing Currency by Firm Size and External Finance Dependence (2007-2013)
Firm Size (Top 10 Percentile) Firm Size (Other Percentile)
External Finance Dependence PCP LCP VCP PCP LCP VCP
Low 0.00% 12.4% 82.5% 0.00% 17.4% 87.6%
Medium 0.0% 35.7% 64.3% 0.02% 28.2% 71.7%
High 1.4% 41.4% 57.1% 0.1% 20.9% 79.0%
invoicing ,which also makes COP less likely to be used. Meanwhile, the vehicle cur-
rency (mainly USD) has less chance to be chosen if the destination country has a
higher level of financial development.
Macro Factor
Inflation and foreign exchange rate volatility are among the two most important
macro factors for invoicing currency choices. Figure 10, 11 and 12 in the appendix
show the relationship between CPI and currency choice. If the country has a higher
inflation, its currency will be less likely to be used. At the same time, the vehicle
currency will be more likely to be used. Figure 13, 14 and 15 in the appendix show
the relationship between foreign exchange volatility and currency choice. Here we
capture the volatility by the coefficient of variation calculated from monthly nominal
exchange rate. If the a currency has a higher volatility against COP, it is less likely
to be used, and the vehicle currency enjoys a better chance.
Micro Factor
For micro factor, we consider the product differentiation categorized by Rauch
(1999). Table 5 shows that homogeneous goods are more likely to rely on VCP for
invoicing, while differentiated goods use more of PCP. This stylized facts are consis-
tent with Goldberg and Tille (2008).
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Strategic Factor
At last, we consider the strategic factor, i.e., firm’s bargaining power. As em-
phasized by Goldberg and Tille (2013), the firm size is a key measure of bargaining
power. Chung (2016) used Top 10 percentile of exporter’s size as a dummy for big
size exporting firms. Table 6 shows the relationship between currency choices, firm
sizes and financial dependence. We can see that larger firms tend to have a lower
share of VCP compared to small firms.
3.4 Advantages and limitation of Colombia Data
Throughout the discussions above, our dataset has four advantages compared with
the recent firm/transaction-level study such as Chung (2016) and Goldberg and Tille
(2013):
(i) The diversity in trade partners and industries. From 2007 to 2013, the total
number of trade partners (destination countries) was more than 130 for exporters.
The share of US is less dominant than the case of Canada and UK. The industries
are also diversified, at both HS4 and HS6 level. This dataset therefore represents a
small open economy exposed to a large number of trade partners.
(ii) Data quality. Our transaction record contains the firm ID of Colombia ex-
porter/importer, so we can do both firm-level and transaction-level analysis. It is also
easy to identify importing and non-importing exporters. More importantly, our data
document a lot of detailed dimensions of each international trade transaction, espe-
cially the transportation mode rarely employed in previous study. This information
can help us measure the dependence on trade finance proposed in Ahn et al. (2011).
(iii) Time frame. Our dataset includes Colombia’s international trade both before
and after the financial crisis (thus great trade collapse and trade finance collapse),
making it feasible to identify how financial market turmoil and trade finance collapse
affect currency choices. The previous studies used either a single year such as 2011 in
Chung (2016), or several years before financial crisis as in Goldberg and Tille (2016).
(iv) Currency choices in developing countries. In contrast to the previous liter-
ature focused more on industrial countries, our exploration of Colombia dataset is
among the first few to study a developing country more dependent on trade finance,
and how that would affect the invoicing currency choice.
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Of course this dataset also has its own limitations. One is that we do not have
currency choices information for Colombia import. In addition, we do not directly
observe the trade finance information such as whether the exporters get trade credit
or not. In the subsequent section, we use various measures to proxy the trade finance
dependence of firms.
To summarize, we provide the descriptive statistics of Colombia dataset in this
section. We report substantial cross-sectional and time series variations in invoicing
currency choices. We also assess the pairwise link between invoicing currency choices
and various drivers, including financial, macro, micro and strategic factors. While
Colombia dataset has obvious limitations, it provides a unique opportunity to study
the invoicing currency choice for a small open economy heavily reliant on trade fi-
nance.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section we employ MNL model to estimate the effects of different factors
and measure their economic significance. We first introduce the econometric model
specification and the construction of variables. Then we present the main empirical
results. A series of robustness checks are also performed, including the transaction-
level tests.
4.1 Econometric Model and Construction of Variables
We take the entire sample of Colombia export to all the destination countries (6.4
million transactions) and reduce it to the firm-product-destination-year level (0.55
million observations). As in Chung (2016), the dimension eliminated is the frequency
of shipping for each exporter (at the product-destination level) within a year. We
denote the exporter by superscript i, the product (at the HS6 level) by superscript
j, and the destination country by superscript e. Furthermore we use k to denote
industry in HS4 level.
In our baseline MNL regression, the categorical dependent variable is an indicator
Lijet taking into account all pricing strategies. We assign L
ije
t = 0 for PCP, L
ije
t = 1
for LCP and Lijet = 2 for VCP. As these three invoicing alternatives are mutually ex-
clusive and exhaustive for each firm-product-destination-year observation, we can use
MNL estimation to analyze the probability of each currency choice. We take PCP as
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the baseline option. Thus the MNL estimations yield two sets of results: LCP versus
PCP and VCP versus PCP. Our baseline specification is
Li,j,et = MNL(FD
e
t ,FD
e
t × TFDi,kt ,FirmTop10i,k,CountrySharek,et ,CPIet ,FXcovet , δr, δs, δt)
where the superscripts i, j, e, k, t denote firm, HS6 product, destination country, HS4
industry and year. δr, δs and δt denote fixed effects for region, SITC1 industry and
year respectively, where the region includes Latin America, Euro, Asia, North Amer-
ica and others. Standard errors are also clustered at HS4 level.
The first explanatory variable FDit measures the destination country’s financial de-
velopment relative to Colombia. It is measured as the amount of financial resources
provided to private sector by financial intermediary as a share of GDP. This measure
has been used extensively in the finance, growth and international trade literature.
In our sample, the financial development varies a lot by country. The bottom three
countries are Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Iraq, while the top three are Japan, Ice-
land and Denmark. We expect a higher level of financial development in destination
country to induce more use of LCP for trade invoicing.
To further identify the effect of financial development, we consider the industry’s
external dependence on finance. Specifically, we use ExtFiank to identify which in-
dustry is more reliant on external finance (including trade finance) as in Manova
(2013), which constructed this measure based on data for all publicly listed US-based
companies from Compustat’s annual industrial files.21 External finance dependence is
the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations. Most
of the external finance are from banks in a variety of ways, including short-term loan
like letter of credit and trade credit.22 The firm-level trade finance dependence is not
directly observed, so we construct an indirect measure based on Manova (2013). It is
calculated as23
21Manova (2013) also considered asset tangibility as another measure of financial vulnerability.
Asset tangibility records the share of net property, plant and equipment in total book-value asset.
We use this alternative measure in the robustness check and our results remain similar.
22As stated in Manova et al. (2015) constructing the industry measures from US data is motivated
by three considerations. First the US has one of the most advanced and sophisticated financial
systems in the world. The behavior of US firms thus plausibly approximates their optimal asset
structure and use of external finance. Second, using US as the reference country is convenient
because of limited data for many other countries, but it also ensures that the measures are not
endogenous to financial development. Finally, identification does not require that sectors have
the same financial sensitivity as US but rather that their ranking remains relatively stable across
countries.
23We thank Stefan Weiergra¨ber for pointing out this novel measure.
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TFDi,kt = ExtFina
k × (−FirmSizeit)
We interact the external finance dependence with the negative of firm size in terms
of absolute export value. When the export firm is smaller in size and engaged in an
industry more dependent on external finance, it will rely much more on trade finance.
A large value of TFDi,kt signifies more dependence on trade finance for small firms in
financially vulnerable sectors.
For strategic factors, we construct a firm-level measure for exporter’s bargaining
power.24 Following Chung (2016) we use the firm size in export value and focus on
the top 10 percentile. FirmSizeTop10 is 1 if the firm size is at the top 10 percentile
of HS4 industry, and 0 otherwise. For the importer’s bargaining power, we use the
market share of the importing country in HS4 industry as Goldberg and Tille (2016)
and denote it as CountryShare. We expect that if the exporting firm has more bar-
gaining power, it has a better chance to use home currency.
For macroeconomic variables, we look at the inflation rate in the destination coun-
try CPIit. Our theory predicts that a currency with high inflation is unappealing to
exporters. We also look at exchange rate volatility, which might be influenced by the
monetary policy in the destination country. FXcovet is the exchange rate volatility in-
volving the destination country’s currency against COP. Our theory, as well as other
literature such as Devereux et al. (2004) and Engel (2006)), predicts a currency with
more volatile exchange rate is less likely to be chosen. We also add the real GDP per
capita to control for economy size.
The data source and construction methodology of these and other variables in our
MNL regression are summarized in table 13 in the appendix.
4.2 Main empirical findings
In table 7 and 8, we summarize the outcome of baseline MNL regression. To ensure
the robustness of our result, we also con. Keep in mind the coefficient estimates from
MNL regressions are odd ratios rather than marginal effects, so we could not directly
compare the coefficient value. Instead, the signs of the coefficients should only be
interpreted as the direction of deviation from the baseline options. We will compute
and discuss the average marginal effects (AME) later.
24Since we do not observe the importer’s firm level information, we can not construct a similar
measure for importers.
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Column (1) and (2) in table 7 and 8 include only financial factors. The positive
and significant coefficient of FDet in table 7 (LCP vs PCP) implies that if the desti-
nation country’s financial development is higher than Colombia, Colombia firms are
more likely to use the destination country’s currency. Similarly, the negative and
significant coefficient of FDet in table 8 (VCP vs PCP) implies that if the destination
country’s financial development is higher than Colombia, it will make Colombia firms
less likely to use the vehicle currency. This result strongly supports our Proposition 1.
We have two additional variables to further evaluate the effect of financial factors.
For firm-level trade finance dependence (TFD), its coefficient estimations are negative
and significant in both tables. This means small Colombia exporters in financially
vulnerable sectors prefer PCP, which is reasonable since these firms are not in a good
position to deal with the risk and uncertainty associated with international trade.
However, the importance of financial development shows up in the interaction term
of FD and Firm TFD, whose coefficients are positive and significant in both tables.
This suggests that when firms export to a destination with better financial devel-
opment, they are more likely to choose LCP or VCP, consistent with our argument
that trade finance is an important channel for invoicing currency choices. In sum, the
MNL regression outcome demonstrates that exporters tend to use the currency with
a more developed and efficient financial market, especially for small firms in finan-
cially vulnerable sectors, confirming the importance of financial market development
in currency choices.
In column (3) the strategic factors are added. We use FirmSizeTop10 for export
firm’s bargaining power, and CountryShare for import country’s bargaining power.
The negative and significant coefficient of FirmSizeTop10 implies that bigger firms
tend to shift the currency choices away from LCP/VCP towards PCP, lending support
to our Proposition 3. In most specifications, import country share has a statistically
significant impacts on currency choices. In particular, it increases the likelihood of
LCP and reduces the probability of VCP, also consistent with our expectation.
In column (4) we further add macroeconomic factors, namely the inflation level
and exchange rate volatility. The coefficient estimations of CPIet and FXcov
e
t are
significantly negative in table 7, which suggests that if the firm is exporting to a des-
tination with high inflation or volatile exchange rate, PCP is preferred over LCP. By
the same token, the significant and positive coefficients in table 8 mean bad monetary
policy increases the likelihood of VCP relative to PCP, also confirming our Proposi-
tion 2.
We also control for real GDP per capita of destination country in model (5). The
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effects from financial development are still statistically significant and all the other key
explanatory variables still have the expected effects. Overall, these results strongly
support the predictions of our model.
Table 7: Baseline empirical results for invoicing currency choice (LCP vs PCP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LCP vs PCP
Financial Development 5.15*** 4.86*** 3.82*** 1.94*** 1.19***
(0.33) (0.4) (0.23) (0.16) (0.17)
Firm TFD -4.47*** -3.83*** -5.05*** -5.16***
(1.28) (1.17) (1.37) (1.47)
FD × Firm TFD 2.84*** 2.32*** 3.37*** 3.54***
(0.92) (0.85) (1.00) (1.11)
Firm Size Dummy -1.36*** -1.33*** -1.22***
(0.35) (0.35) (0.36)
Importer Country Share in HS4 3.66*** 2.16*** 1.98***
(0.63) (0.52) (0.56)
Inflation -0.38*** -0.30***
(0.04) (0.05)
Exchange Rate Volatility -74.28*** -49.2***
(5.09) (5.22)
GDP per capita 0.39***
(0.05)
Observations 545,022 545,022 545,022 545,022 545,022
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the firm-product-destination-year level. The default option is PCP and
estimates of LCP versus PCP are reported. Column (1) to Column (5) consider all samples while
Column (6) consider non-U.S. destinations. Fixed effects: δr for region level including North
America, Latin America, Euro Area, Asia and others; δs are for SITC-1 industry. Standard errors
are clustered at the HS4 level (1098 clusters) and are reported in parenthesis.
*** indicates significance at 1% level.
** indicates significance at 5% level.
* indicates significance at 10% level.
4.3 Robustness
We consider two sets of robustness test: including additional control variables pro-
posed in the previous literature, and performing the transaction level tests as Gold-
berg and Tille (2016). In sum, our baseline outcome remains robust with various
specifications of regression.
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Table 8: Baseline empirical results for invoicing currency choice (VCP vs PCP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VCP vs PCP
Financial Development -0.81*** -0.74*** -0.81*** -0.57*** -0.73***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09)
Firm TFD -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.26***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
FD × Firm TFD 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Firm Size Dummy -1.15*** -1.20*** -1.19***
(0.34) (0.35) (0.33)
Importer Country Share in HS4 -0.81*** -1.07*** -0.2
(0.39) (0.36) (0.4)
Inflation 0.05*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01)
Exchange Rate Volatility 13.73*** 23.9***
(4.33) (4.78)
GDP per capita -0.16***
(0.04)
Observations 545,022 545,022 545,022 545,022 545,022
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The default option is PCP and estimates of VCP versus PCP are reported. Other details are
as in Table 7.
Table 9: Baseline empirical results for invoicing currency choice (VCP vs LCP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VCP vs LCP
Financial Development -5.96*** -4.86*** -4.73*** -2.5*** -1.99***
(0.32) (0.40) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17)
Firm TFD 4.47*** 3.33*** 4.35*** 4.78***
(1.28) (1.12) (1.16) (1.45)
FD × Firm TFD -2.84*** -2.0** -2.8*** -3.22***
(0.92) (0.80) (0.81) (1.07)
Firm Size Dummy 0.25** 0.13 0.03
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Importer Country Share in HS4 -4.5*** -2.97*** -2.1
(0.6) (0.48) (0.46)
Inflation 0.52*** 0.39***
(0.04) (0.05)
Exchange Rate Volatility 70.25*** 67.9***
(3.2) (3.7)
GDP per capita -1.5***
(0.05)
Observations 545,022 545,022 545,022 545,022 545,022
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The default option is PCP and estimates of VCP versus LCP are reported. Other details are
as in Table 7.
29
4.3.1 Additional Controls
Macro Factors
In addition to GDP per capita, we add two dummy variables to capture exchange
rate regimes. Dpeg and Epeg denote the USD peg and EUR peg respectively. This
is the variable considered in both Goldberg and Tille (2016) and Chung (2016). If a
destination country pegs its home currency to USD or Euro, it’s a signal of disciplined
monetary policy, and we expect that to increase LCP and decrease VCP. Column (1)
in table 10 and 11 present the estimation result. Colombia exporters are more likely
to use LCP when the destination countries have currency peg. They are also less
likely to choose VCP when the destination countries peg currency to Euro. Impor-
tantly, the key explanatory variables from our baseline empirical model still have the
expected and significant results as before.
Micro Factors
First we try to capture the degree of product differentiation. The standard in
Rauch (1999) helps divide SITC4 level into two groups: homogeneous goods with ref-
erence price or standard exchange, and differentiated goods. We construct a dummy
variable such that it is equal to 1 if the goods are homogeneous and 0 otherwise.
Both our theory and Goldberg and Tille (2008) predict that international trade of
homogeneous goods relies more on VCP, although with different mechanism.25 This
dummy is therefore expected to be positive in both regressions.
Another control variable at micro level is the status of exporter. Chung (2016)
convincingly showed that importing exporters tend to use foreign currency to denomi-
nate their export of final goods, in order to hedge their currency exposure in imported
intermediate goods. We follow this finding and construct a dummy equal to 1 if the
exporter is also doing import in the same year. This is possible in our dataset since
Colombia firms share the same ID in their custom invoice for export and import.
Column (2) in table 10 and 11 is the MNL regression outcome, mostly within our
expectation above. The exporter are more likely to use LCP/VCP when the goods
are homogeneous. For the differentiated goods, PCP is more likely. As for importing
25According to Goldberg and Tille (2008), exporters of homogeneous goods are expected to place
a relatively higher weight in limiting their price fluctuation relative to that of their competitors,
leading invoicing to coalesce around USD. Our search theory argues that, exporters of homogeneous
good would be similar in their gain from gain, so the crucial determinants of currency choice are
financial and macro factors, which makes USD a better candidate.
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Table 10: Robustness with additional controls (LCP vs PCP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LCP vs PCP Macro Micro Strategic All Controls Non-US
Financial Development 1.68*** 2.14*** 1.88*** 0.62*** 0.76***
(0.35) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.11)
FD × Firm TFD 2.97** 3.80*** 2.85* 3.67** 3.93**
(1.20) (0.99) (1.46) (1.53) (1.74)
Firm Size Dummy -1.05*** -1.60*** -1.40*** -1.20*** -1.22***
(0.41) (0.34) (0.35) (0.12) (0.40)
Inflation -1.19*** -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.31*** -0.32***
(0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Exchange Rate Volatility -226.3*** -83.72*** -73.19*** -6.70 6.67
(22.04) (6.28) (4.90) (11.2) (13.8)
GDP per capita 0.6*** 1.10*** 1.09***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.10)
Dollar Peg 4.96*** 5.05*** 5.19***
(0.40) (0.30) (0.39)
Euro Peg 0.86* 0.89* 0.79*
(0.46) (0.46) (0.44)
Homogeneous goods 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.36***
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
Importing Exporters 0.31*** 0.74*** 0.81***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.17)
Firm Herfindal Index in HS4 -0.28 0.13 0.05
(0.22) (0.25) (0.26)
Firm Size (Absolute Value) 0.65 -0.04 -0.07
(0.82) (0.06) (0.06)
Importer Country Share in HS4 2.13*** 1.33** 1.57**
(0.52) (0.60) (0.73)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The default option is PCP and estimates of LCP versus PCP are reported. Other details are as in
Table 7
exporters, they are more likely to use LCP/VCP relative to PCP. Again, the key
explanatory variables from our baseline empirical model still have the expected and
significant estimation results.
Strategic Factors
Alternative measures are also added to better represent firm’s bargaining power.
Following Sokolova (2015), we construct another firm-level bargaining power for the
exporters Herfindali,et , which is the Herfindal index at HS4-country level. A large
value of this variable means a higher degree of market concentration, implying more
bargaining power on firm’s part. Additionally, We also capture firm size by the total
FOB value within a year, only to complement with the previous dummy variable cal-
culated from quantiles. This variable is also considered in Goldberg and Tille (2016).
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Table 11: Robustness with additional controls (VCP vs PCP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VCP vs PCP Macro Micro Strategic All Controls Non-US
Financial Development -0.83*** -0.60*** -0.62*** -0.86*** -0.82***
(0.18) (0.08) (0.08) (0.17) (0.14)
FD × Firm TFD 0.47** 0.53*** -0.01 0.38* 0.40**
(0.18) (0.17) (0.94) (0.22) (0.16)
Firm Size Dummy -0.96** -1.33*** -1.25*** -1.16*** -1.17***
(0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.36) (0.10)
Inflation 0.018 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.02 0.002
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Exchange Rate Volatility 29.03*** 14.80*** 14.77*** 29.5*** 26.77***
(10.07) (4.04) (4.09) (9.9) (5.8)
GDP per capita -0.42*** -0.41*** -0.31***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Dollar Peg -0.15 -0.12 0.16
(0.23) (0.24) (0.20)
Euro Peg -1.48*** -1.52*** -1.50*
(0.41) (0.41) (0.24)
Homogeneous goods 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.37***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
Importing Exporters 0.33*** 0.69*** 0.76***
(0.07) (0.15) (0.10)
Firm Herfindal Index in HS4 -0.11 -0.69** -0.79***
(0.21) (0.25) (0.25)
Firm Size (Absolute Value) 0.62 0.07 0.06
(0.81) (0.06) (0.05)
Importer Country Share in HS4 -1.10*** 0.41 0.17
(0.36) (0.53) (0.46)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The default option is PCP and estimates of VCP versus PCP are reported. Other details are as in
Table 7
The results are present in Column (3) in table 10 and 11. Compared to the firm
size measured in Top 10 percentile, both the absolute firm size and firm’s Herfindal
index fail to deliver a robust result.
All Controls: All Countries and Non-US Countries
Column (5) and (6) consider all the control variables for the whole sample and
non-US destinations respectively. The main results still hold. We also could notice
that CPI has robust and significant effects on the LCP vs PCP, the FXcov has
robust and significant effects on the VCP vs PCP when we add all controls.
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4.3.2 Transaction-level Tests
In this section we perform robustness test at transaction level. For additional
strategic factors, we create a trade size dummy equal to 1 for top 5th percentile
transaction by value. For trade finance dependence, the following measure is included.
TFDt = Transt × (−FirmiSize)
Notice that Transt is the transportation mode for each transaction. We assign
Transt = 1 if it is shipped by sea, while Transt = 0 for other transportation modes.
This is motivated by Ahn et al. (2011): although we can not observe the trade finance
dependence on each transaction, the goods shipped by sea will need a longer time to
deliver and tend to use more trade finance. Moreover, we also assume smaller firms
tend to rely more on trade finance. We also consider a financial crisis dummy Crisis
equal to 1 if the transaction happened between June 2008 and June 2009 following
Ahn et al. (2011). We interact the crisis dummy with transaction mode dummy to
see the effect of great trade collapse and its influence on currency choices.
The transaction-level empirical test is present in table 14 where we report three
different specifications. The model (1) consider all the main explanatory variables
plus a trade size dummy. Model (2) consider the interaction between financial devel-
opment and transaction-level trade finance dependence. Model (3) consider the crisis
dummy and test how great trade collapse affect the currency choices.
The results in model (1) shows the main results still hold in transaction level
data. We find that when the transaction size is large, it tends to shift toward PCP.
We consider the transaction-level trade finance dependence in model (2) and the re-
sults show that trades that are more dependent on trade finance will be more likely
to be used in VCP. Results in model (3) shows that during the financial crisis when
the trade finance in USD was disrupted, the currency choice shifts away from VCP
toward PCP and LCP.
4.4 Economic Significance
In MNL regression, the coefficients can not be compared directly, so we need to
calculate average marginal effects (AME). Table 12 shows the result. The AME in
baseline model is measured as one standard deviation increase in the key independent
variable. We find that the two most important determinants in AME are monetary
policy and financial development. For inflation level and exchange rate volatility, an
increase of one standard deviation would lower LCP by 6.8% and 3.8%. Financial
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development also demonstrates considerable magnitude: one standard deviation in-
crease brings up LCP by 3.4%. The effects of other drivers are relatively smaller: less
than 1% for strategic factors and around 2% for GDP per capita.
For counter-factual analysis, if a country with medium-level financial develop-
ment successfully upgrades financial market to the top level like Japan (3 standard-
deviation increase), its home currency usage in international trades will be promoted
by more than 10% (3.4%*3=10.2%). For China, its current levels of financial de-
velopment and GDP per capita are both around medium level. So, if China could
successfully improve both to the top level, RMB use will be promoted by around 16%
(3/4%*3+1.9%*3=15.9%).
Table 12: Average Marginal Effect (AME)
FD CPI FXcov Firm Size Country Market Share GDP per capita
LCP vs PCP +3.4% −6.8% −3.8% −0.1% +0.9% +1.9%
VCP vs PCP −3.5% +6.8% +3.9% −0.4% −0.9% −2.0%
5 Conclusion
This paper is focused on financial market’s influence on invoicing currency choices
at firm level. First of all, we build a unified framework with financial frictions to ad-
dress the determinants of currency choice, emphasizing the roles of financial market
development, as well as monetary policy and firm’s bargaining power. In an open
economy monetary search model, the usage of a particular currency will emerge en-
dogenously, and strategic complementaries among exporters, importers and bankers
reinforce the status of international currency. Next, with highly disaggregated data
from Colombia exporters, we provide firm-level evidence that financial factors sig-
nificantly affect the patterns of currency usage. The MNL regressions show that
exporters tend to use the currency with a more developed and efficient financial
market, especially for small firms in financially vulnerable sectors. In particular, a
median developing country could enhance its home currency usage by more than
10% through financial market development. Furthermore, bad monetary policy and
low bargaining power of exporters will severely restrict the popularity of a currency.
These results have important policy implication for currency internationalization in
developing countries.
Although it is the first step to add financial intermediary in the open-economy
monetary search model to study endogenous currency choices, a promising future work
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is to endogenize financial intermediary. Also, it would also be very interesting to test
the model’s predictions using China’s firm-level data to see whether our empirical
results still hold in other developing countries. A structural estimation of our model
also has hope to deliver more novel results.
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A Appendix
A.1 Monetary equilibrium of international trade
A.1.1 Two-country model
Given agent’s optimal choice, money market should clear. Here we focus on mon-
etary equilibrium allowing for international trade. ∀i, j = {1, 2}, i 6= j
σiφim
i
i = φiMi if {si, sj} = {0, 1}
σiφim
i
i + (1− 2σi)φizij + Fij = φiMi if {si, sj} = {0, 0}
σjφim
j
i + (1− 2σi)φizii + Fii = φiMi if {si, sj} = {1, 1}
σiφim
i
i + σjφim
j
i + (1− 2σi)φi(zii + zij) + Fij + Fii = φiMi if {si, sj} = {1, 0}
(14)
With agent’s optimal choice and money market clearing condition, now it’s possi-
ble to define a stationary monetary equilibrium allowing the existence of international
trade.
A stationary monetary equilibrium that allows for international trade is a list of
time-invariant values including trade volume {qij}2i,j=1, banker’s holding of real bal-
ance {φizi}2i=1, and seller’s currency choice {si}2i=1 such that, given other agent’s
behavior,
1. Seller’s choice of {si}2i=1 solves 7 ;
2. Banker’s choice of {φizi}2i=1 solves 8;
3. Buyer’s choice of {qij}2i,j=1 solves 9 and 10 ;
4. Money market clears so that 14 holds.
A.1.2 Three-country model
Since our main interest in three-country model is to explain the rise of IVC, here
we consider a special case of hegemony in which all international trade is settled in
country 1 currency. The following equilibrium condition is in order.
For seller
pi1ij = J
1
j φ1m
i
1 − c(qi1) > 0, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i 6= j (15)
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Here Jmn ≡ (1 − Fmn(1−2σm)φmzmn )(1 + Rm)−1 is the financial premium for country n
seller to choose country m currency. The seller’s equilibrium conditions state that
international trade should be profitable for all exporters if they choose country 1
currency.
For banker
1 +R1 =
(n12 + n13)φ1m
1
1 + (n21 + n23)φ1m
2
1 + (n31 + n32)φ1m
3
1
(1− 2σ1)φ1z1 (16)
Here z1 ≡ z11 + z12 + z13 is the total liquidity held by country 1 banker.
For buyer
R1 = (p11 + p12 + p13)L(q
1
1) = (p21 + p23)L(q
2
1) = (p31 + p32)L(q
3
1)
R2 = p22L(q
2
2)
R3 = p33L(q
3
3)
(17)
Money market
φ1(σ1m
1
1 + σ2m
2
1 + σ3m
3
1) + (1− 2σ1)φ1z1 + F11 + F12 + F13 = φ1M1
σ2φ2m
2
2 = φ2M2
σ3φ3m
3
3 = φ3M3
(18)
Similar to the two-country model above, the definition of monetary equilibrium
condition is the following.
A stationary monetary equilibrium in three-country model with country 1 currency
as the single IVC is a list of time-invariant values including trade volume {qij}3i,j=1,
banker’s holding of real balance {φizi}3i=1, and all exporter’s choosing country 1 cur-
rency such that, given other agent’s behavior,
1. Seller’s profit level satisfies 15
2. Banker’s choice of {φizi}2i=1 solves 16
3. Buyer’s choice of {qij}2i,j=1 solves 17
4. Money market clears so that 18 holds.
The incumbency advantage applies here: as long as individual sellers enjoy positive
profit from international trade, they have no incentive to deviate from the existing
equilibrium of single international currency.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
A.2.1 Inflation and Currency Depreciation
Proposition 2.1 High inflation and currency depreciation would lower the interna-
tional use of currency.
Notice that inflation level is tightly linked with nominal exchange rate in search
model. If Law of One Price (LOP) holds for nume´raire good, the determinant equation
for exchange rate is
et = φj,t/φi,t =
1 + µi,t
1 + µj,t
where et is the nominal exchange rate of currency i against currency j at time t, and
the last equation holds if two countries had identical money growth rate in the last
period. Obviously, a high level of inflation caused by rapid growth rate of money
supply would also lead to currency depreciation.
From the FOC of buyer, high inflation and currency depreciation reduces his
holding of real balance. Recall that, for country i buyer’s holding of home currency,
his FOC is the following.
Ri = (pii + (1− sj)pij) θ(u
′ − c′/β)
(1− θ)u′ + θc′/β
Given that buyer’s liquidity premium is decreasing in trade volume, an increase of
nominal interest rate from high inflation would increase the marginal cost of using
money, thus lowering buyer’s holding of real balance.
On the part of bankers, if country i exporters choose home currency, the FOC for
country i banker is the following.
1 +Ri =
njiφim
j
i
(1− 2σi)φizii
Higher level of nominal interest rate would therefore decrease the currency holding
by both buyer and banker in this case.
On the part of sellers, the profit function for country i exporters to choose home
currency is the following.
pii =
(
1− Fii
(1− 2σi)φizii
)(
1
1 +Ri
)
φim
j
i − c(qji )
High inflation would directly reduce exporter’s profit through discount factor. It also
has the indirect effect in lowering the currency holding by both buyer and banker,
further decreasing exporter’s incentive to choose this currency. In sum, high inflation
and currency depreciation would lower the international use of currency.
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A.2.2 Monetary Policy Volatility
Proposition 2.2 If the gross nominal interest rate follows a log-normal distribution,
the increase of monetary policy uncertainty would lower the international use of cur-
rency.
Proof
We introduce the uncertainty of monetary policy by assuming the gross nominal
interest rate follows a log-normal distribution, i.e., ln(1 + Ri,t) ∼ N (xi, σ2i ), where
i ∈ {1, 2} stands for the issuing country of currency and t indicates period. If we
further assume the law of one price holds for nume´raire good and monetary policy in
two countries is identical in the last period, the nominal exchange rate would then
follow a log-normal distribution.
et ≡ φ2,t
φ1,t
=
1 + µ1,t
1 + µ2,t
=
1 +R1,t
1 +R2,t
⇒ ln et = ln(1 +R1,t)− ln(1 +R2,t)⇒
ln et ∼ N (x1 − x2, σ21 + σ22)
The impact of uncertainty on buyer could be derived from his first order condition on
currency holding. First consider country i buyer’s optimal holding of home currency.
E(Ri,t) = (pii + (1− sj)pij) θ(u
′ − c′/β)
(1− θ)u′ + θc′/β , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j
Given the log-normal distribution of gross nominal interest rate, buyer’s expectation
would be related with volatility, i.e., E(Ri,t) = exp(xi+σ2i /2)−1. Therefore, a rise of
monetary policy volatility would also increase buyer’s expectation of nominal interest
rate, which is also his cost of holding money. After some transformation, we rewrite
the FOC as
A
[
exp(xi + σ
2
i /2)− 1
]
= G(q) ≡ u
′ − c′/β
(1− θ)u′ + θc′/β (19)
where A ≡ [(pii + (1− sj)pij)θ]−1. The volatility of monetary policy would decrease
trade volume and buyer’s currency holding as long as G(q) is a decreasing function,
i.e. G′(q) < 0. Given the assumption on function form such that u′ > 0, c′ > 0, u′′ <
0, c′′ > 0, it’s easy to show that
G′(q) =
1
β
[
(1− θ)u′ + θc′/β]−2(u′′c′ − u′c′′) < 0 (20)
The procedure and result are similar for country i buyer’s holding of foreign currency.
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For bankers, his optimal currency holding is linked with buyer’s decision through
FOC. For example, in the case of PCP, banker’s optimal choice is given by the fol-
lowing condition.
E(1 +Ri,t) =
njiφim
j
i
(1− 2σi)φizii ⇒ exp(xi + σ
2
i /2) =
njiφim
j
i
(1− 2σi)φizii
If both buyers and bankers perceived a higher level of monetary policy uncertainty,
LHS of the above equation would increase. Given the results on buyer’s optimal
choice, his currency holding would decrease corresponding to the rising uncertainty.
Consequently, banker’s currency holding would decrease by a larger degree. Therefore,
banker’s response to volatility is in the same direction as buyer’s.
Lastly, seller’s profit from international trade is given by
pii ≡
[
1− Fii
(1− 2σi)φizii
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
financial development
(
1
1 +Ri
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
discount
φim
j
i − c(qji )︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain from trade
The drop of other agent’s currency holding would lower exporter’s profit ( ∂pii
∂φizii
>
0, ∂pii
∂φim
j
i
> 0), thus reducing his incentive to use this currency. In sum, under general
assumptions on function form, the increase of monetary policy uncertainty, such as
inflation fluctuation and exchange rate volatility, would reduce the international use
of a currency.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Here we prove the relationship between exporter’s bargaining power and his cur-
rency choice. As shown previously, exporter’s profit function is the following if trade
is settled by his home currency.
pi =
[
1− F
(1− 2σ)φz
](
1
1 +R
)
φm− c(q)
In contrast, if exporter settles international trade with foreign currency, he would
suffer additional loss τ from cross-border transaction, which is assumed to be an
increasing function of the real payment amount, i.e. τ = τ(φm), ∂τ
∂(φm)
> 0. His
profit therefore becomes
pi∗ =
(
1− τ(φ∗m∗)
)[
1− F
∗
(1− 2σ)φ∗z∗
](
1
1 +R∗
)
φ∗m∗ − c(q∗)
where superscript of asterisk denotes foreign variable. Here we focus on partial equi-
librium analysis, so that production level q and variables in financial market such as
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F, φz, and R are fixed from the perspective of exporter. This means exporter’s bar-
gaining power would affect real payment amount (φm) directly through bargaining
and cross-border transaction cost (τ(φm)) indirectly.
Proposition 3.1 In partial equilibrium, exporters with higher bargaining power pre-
fer to use home currency if transaction cost is elastic in real payment amount, i.e.
∂(1−τ)
∂(φm)
φm
1−τ < −1.
Proof Recall the following equation from the proportional bargaining game between
exporter and importer
φm− c(q)/β = (1− θ)[u(q)− c(q)/β]
Keep q fixed and take differentiation with respect to exporter’s bargaining power
(1− θ).
∂(φm)
∂(1− θ) ∣∣q=q¯ = u(q)− c(q)/β > 0 (21)
This intuitive result means importer’s real payment is increasing in exporter’s bar-
gaining power. Given that trade settled with home currency doesn’t have transaction
cost, so we have in a partial equilibrium
∂pi
∂(1− θ)∣∣q=q¯ =
[
1− F
(1− 2σ)φz
](
1
1 +R
)
∂(φm)
∂(1− θ) > 0 (22)
with the obvious interpretation that exporters with high bargaining power would gain
more profit if the trade is settled by home currency. For trade settled with foreign
currency, however, transaction cost would make the analysis complicated. Again take
differentiation of exporter’s profit with respect to his bargaining power
∂pi∗
∂(1− θ)∣∣q=q¯ =
(
1−τ
)[
1− F
∗
(1− 2σ)φ∗z∗
](
1
1 +R∗
)[
∂(φ∗m∗)
∂(1− θ)
][
1+
∂(1− τ)
∂(φ∗m∗)
φ∗m∗
1− τ
]
(23)
Given that ∂(φ
∗m∗)
∂(1−θ) > 0 in partial equilibrium, exporters with high bargaining power
might experience profit decrease if transaction cost is elastic in real payment amount,
i.e. [
1 +
∂(1− τ)
∂(φ∗m∗)
φ∗m∗
1− τ
]
< 0⇒ ∂(1− τ)
∂(φ∗m∗)
φ∗m∗
1− τ < −1⇒
∂pi∗
∂(1− θ) ∣∣q=q¯ < 0 (24)
In summary, for exporters with high bargaining power, they always enjoy better profit
if trade is settled by home currency, but they might experience profit loss if trade is
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settled by foreign currency and transaction cost is elastic in real payment amount,
and this would lead to exporters more likely to choose home currency.
A.4 Complementary Tables and Graphs
Table 15 shows the time series of different currency choice. Before the financial
crisis, 63.1 % of the transactions are invoiced in vehicle currency (mainly USD). After
the financial crisis, the share of VCP declined and then bump up after 2010. Although
PCP is small in proportion, it is increasing in the sample years.
Table 16 reveal the currency denomination of exports for all industries. We also
observe a significant variation in invoicing currency across industries. The use of LCP
is very low in Machinery industry and relatively hight in food industry.
Table 17 shows per exporter distribution of the number of HS 4/6-digit prod-
uct exported, the number of transactions, the number of destination countries, the
number of currencies and total export value. In 2013, in terms of HS 6-digit prod-
ucts, the median firm exports 1 product while the top one percent exporters sell 44
products. Similarly, if we focus on destination country, the median firm exports to 1
country while the top one percent exporters sell products to more than 22 countries.
Most of the firms are using one currency for trade invoicing while some of them are
using more than 2 different currencies. This skewed distribution is typical in the
international trade data. Table 18 shows the per HS 4-digit product distributions
of total exports, and the number of exporters, destination countries, currencies and
transactions. More than 25% of the industries use more than 2 currencies while 10%
use more than 3 currencies. Again, these distributions are skewed, with the median
number of exporters and destination countries being much smaller. Table 19 shows
distributions over exporter-HS4-digit Industry pairs, which are particularly skewed so
that the vast majority involves an exporter selling a given product to a single country
in USD value. For more than 50% of the export-product pairs, however, the exporter
sells the same HS 4-digit product to multiple countries and in large USD value. More
importantly, for each exporter-HS4 industry pair, only one single currency will be
used in most of the cases.
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Table 13: Variable construction and Data Source
Name Description Source
FD (financial development) Private credit over GDP
relative to Colombia level
World Bank
Inflation Import country’s YOY change of CPI IMF
FX volatility Coefficient of variation for monthly
bilateral exchange rate in a year
IMF
Real GDP Import country’s real GDP, in log World Bank
EFD
(external finance dependence)
Share of capital expenditures
not financed by operation cash flow
Manova (2013)
Firm Size FOB value of firm’s total export
in a year, in absolute value
Colombia Export Database
TFD (trade finance dependence) TFD=EFD×(-Firm size) Author’s calculation
Firm size dummy Equal to 1 if firm size is at top 10% of HS4
industry
Colombia Export Database
Country share Share of import country in HS4 industry Colombia Export Database
USD/EUR Peg Equal to 1 if import country’s currency is
pegged to USD or EUR
IMF
Homogeneous good Equal to 1 if reference-priced or
the commodity has standard exchange
Rauch (1999)
Importing exporters Equal to 1 if export firm is also importing
in the same year
Colombia Export Database
Herfindal (Industry) Index for Firm share in HS4 industry
(measure competitiveness)
Colombia Export Database
Herfindal (Country) Import country share in HS4 industry
(measure competitiveness)
Colombia Export Database
Trade size dummy Equal to 1 if transaction size is at 5% of total
transaction in a year
Colombia Export Database
Trans Equal to 1 if transported by sea Colombia Export Database
TFD (transaction level) TFD (transaction level)=Trans ×(-Firm
size)
Author’s calculation
Crisis Equal to 1 if transaction happens between
June 2008 and June 2009
Ahn et al. (2011)
Table 14: Transaction Level Tests
(1) (2) (3)
Variables LCP VCP LCP VCP LCP VCP
FD 2.8*** -1.1*** 3.4*** -0.7*** 4.1*** -0.7***
Firm Size Dummy -3.7*** -3.0*** -5.3*** -4.7*** -5.4*** -4.3***
CPI -0.69*** -0.65*** -0.24***
FXcov 23.6*** 15.3** 14.4***
Trade size dummy -1.4** -0.5***
FD × TFD 4.5 9.4***
Trans × Crisis -1.12* -1.06***
Observations 4,490,473 4,490,473 4,490,473 4,490,473 4,490,473 4,490,473
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 15: Currency of invoicing in Colombia exports (percent %)
VCP PCP LCP
2007 63.127 0.008 36.865
2008 60.969 0.319 38.713
2009 58.803 0.309 40.888
2010 56.073 0.362 43.565
2011 60.491 0.449 39.060
2012 62.447 0.503 37.050
2013 67.128 0.610 32.262
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Table 16: Currency of invoicing by industry (percent %)
SITC VCP PCP LCP
0: Food and live animals 46.628 0.756 52.616
1: Beverages and tobacco 97.004 0.000 2.996
2: Crude materials 66.829 0.002 33.169
3: Mineral fuels 96.893 0.578 2.529
4: Animals and veg.oils 84.470 0.025 15.505
5: Chemicals 91.178 0.016 8.807
6: Manufactured goods 67.431 0.032 32.537
7: Machinery 100.000 0.000 0.000
8: Miscellaneous 80.845 0.107 19.048
9: Unclassified 90.917 0.097 8.986
Table 17: Distribution over Exporters (2013)
p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 mean
Number of HS4 exported 1 1 3 7 30 3.331
Number of HS6 exported 1 1 4 9 44 4.446
Number of Transactions 1 4 21 117 1,421 91.65
Number of Destinations 1 1 2 6 22 2.746
Number of Currency 1 1 1 1 2 1.05
Export value (thousand USD) 6 36 269,738 1,796 50,910 5,529
Table 18: Distribution over HS-4 Industry (2013)
p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 mean
Number of Exporters 4 11 32 73 311 30.73
Number of HS6 exported 1 2 4 7 14 3.338
Number of Transactions 12 69 363 1,427 10,273 845.4
Number of Destinations 4 10 21 34 68 14.59
Number of Currency 1 1 2 3 5 1.5
Export value (thousand USD) 90 868 5,839 29,550 447,500 51,000
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Table 19: Distribution over Exporter and HS-4 Industry Pairs (2013)
p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 mean
Number of HS6 exported 1 1 1 2 5 1.335
Number of Transactions 1 2 7 28 434 27.52
Number of Destinations 1 1 2 4 15 2.076
Number of Currency 1 1 1 1 2 1.02
Export Value (thousand USD) 0.7 5.5 40 280 11,010 1,660
Figure 3: Share of Currency: US Dollar
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Figure 4: Share of Currency: Euro
Figure 5: Share of Currency: Colombia Peso
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Figure 6: Share of Currency: Other Currencies
Figure 7: LCP and Financial Development
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Figure 8: PCP and Financial Development
Figure 9: VCP and Financial Development
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Figure 10: LCP and Inflation
Figure 11: PCP and Inflation
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Figure 12: VCP and Inflation
Figure 13: LCP and Exchange Rate Volatility
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Figure 14: PCP and Exchange Rate Volatility
Figure 15: VCP and Exchange Rate Volatility
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